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15.1  Introduction 
One of the key elements of the approach to the debt problem that 
has dominated official thinking since 1982 has been an effort to mobilize 
private flows of capital to countries with debt-servicing problems. Bank 
lending in particular was expected to provide most of the capital flow 
under the debt strategy as it first emerged in  1983, and was supposed 
to play  a  major role  under the Baker initiative of  1985. Yet  in fact 
private  capital flows to problem debtors have consistently fallen far 
short of expectations. To  a first approximation the debtors have made 
resource transfers equal to interest less official inflows. Since official 
inflows themselves have been fairly small, the end result has been that 
debtors have been forced to run massive trade surpluses. 
The purpose of this chapter is to reexamine the prospects for private 
capital flows to problem debtors. The central question is whether it is 
possible to induce sufficient capital inflows to aid substantially in the 
servicing of debt. 
The chapter is in three parts. Section 15.2 reviews the rationale for 
new private capital flows to  countries that are having difficulty servicing 
their current debt. Section 15.3 asks why this seemingly solid rationale 
has not so far been matched  by an equally solid flow of financing in 
practice. Section  15.4 then considers whether private capital can be 
attracted through  innovative  mechanisms, such as debt-equity  con- 
versions, instead of through the concerted bank lending that has been 
the basis of private capital flows so far. 
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15.2  The Rationale for Private Capital Inflows 
To a man from Mars, or The WalE  Street Journal, the proposition 
that new lending is essential to deal with the debt crisis seems extremely 
strange-a  proposal to  throw good money after bad. Yet private capital 
inflow has been a centerpiece of the official strategy for dealing with 
the debt crisis. Its rationale rests on two points: the possibility that a 
country may have growing debt yet be growing more creditworthy over 
time, and the possibility  that lending at a loss may be in the interest 
of the creditors if  it defends the value of existing claims. 
15.2.1  The Analytics of Debt Growth and Creditworthiness 
Consider the following numerical example. A country has a GNP of 
$200 billion, and an external debt of $100 billion  (slightly above the 
average debt to GNP ratio for the IMF’s category of “fifteen  heavily 
indebted countries”). It must pay an interest rate of  9 percent on the 
debt. The world inflation rate is 4 percent, and the country’s real GNP 
is expected to grow at an annual rate of 3 percent. 
If the country were obliged to pay all interest out of current income, 
then even if  all principal were rescheduled it would be obliged to run 
a surplus on noninterest current account of $9 billion, or 4.5 percent 
of GNP. While such a surplus is not impossible to run, it is sufficiently 
large to impose substantial strains on the economic and political situ- 
ation in debtor countries. 
Suppose, however,  that the country is able to attract $4 billion  of 
new  money.  Then it  will  need to run  a  noninterest surplus of  only 
$5 billion, or 2.5 percent of GNP-a  more tolerable number.  It might 
at first seem that this simply puts the country even deeper into debt- 
which in a literal sense it does, since the debt grows by 4 percent. The 
country’s real GNP, however, we have assumed will grow at 3 percent, 
which together with the price increase of 4 percent will imply 7 percent 
growth in money GNP. Thus the ratio of debt to GNP  will fall, and the 
country will be in a more favorable position, not a less favorable one, 
at the start of the next year. 
In fact, if  the country were merely seeking to stabilize its ratio of 
debt to GNP, it could borrow $7 billion, and make net payments of 
only $2 billion,  or 1 percent of GNP. If  it were able to borrow this 
much, and willing to devote 1 percent of GNP  to net interest payments 
indefinitely, it could honor all its debt commitments. If the real interest 
rate were lower, or the growth rate higher,  the necessary resource 
transfer (noninterest current account) would be even smaller. Calcu- 
lations of this kind underlay the optimism of many economists about 
the debt of LDCs in the 1970s, and continue to be the basis of optimistic 
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Despite this favorable long-term arithmetic, claims on many heavily 
indebted countries continue to be viewed as highly  risky, and sell at 
well below par on the secondary market. The reason for this is pre- 
sumably that the favorable arithmetic  depends on countries’ willingness 
to continue moderate resource transfer for very extended periods. With 
debt equal to half of GNP, growth at 3 percent, and real interest rate 
of 5 percent, resource transfer at the rate of 2.5 percent of GNP would 
have to continue  for 25 years to work off all the debt. If “debtor fatigue” 
were to set in  before that, preventing further resource transfer,  the 
debt would be worth less than par, even if the country were willing to 
run surpluses  for quite a while. For example, even ten years of resource 
transfer would provide a present value of resource transfer equal to 
only 45 percent of the value of the debt. 
Doubt over whether debtors will be willing to run the trade surpluses 
needed to honor their debts for the very extended periods thus envis- 
aged underlies the unwillingness of banks or other lenders to provide 
new money to the problem debtors. However, there remains a case for 
new lending by existing creditors to defend the value of their claims. 
This case for “involuntary,”  or perhaps more  accurately, defensive 
lending, underlies the concept and rhetoric of the US-IMF debt strategy. 
15.2.2  The Case for Defensive Lending 
When does it make sense to lend more money to a country already 
having trouble servicing its debt? The issue is often framed as one of 
liquidity versus solvency: The country is illiquid, that is, short of cash 
to pay its debt service, but it is solvent, that is, given time it will be 
able and  (more important) willing to make  resource transfers to its 
creditors equal  in  present value  to its debt. However, it  is quickly 
apparent upon reflection that this cannot be quite right; if  a country 
were known to be merely  illiquid, not insolvent, it would be able to 
attract voluntary lending to deal with its liquidity problem. It is only 
the possibility of a solvency problem that creates the liquidity problem. 
The right way to think about the situation is as one of uncertainty 
in  which  defensive  lending  by  existing creditors buys an option to 
collect on their claims in the future if the situation improves. Suppose 
that it is fairly likely that a country will fail to pay its debt in full even 
if  it is able to avoid an immediate crisis; but that it is virtually certain 
that the country will repudiate an important part of its obligations if 
its  creditors attempt to collect  full  interest immediately.  Then new 
lending that reduces the interest burden, although a losing proposition 
in isolation, may be worthwhile because it improves the expected value 
of the initial debt. 
Even under very adverse circumstances this defensive lending ar- 
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see why, consider the basic algebra of the situation. Let D be a coun- 
try’s outstanding debt, and d be the subjective discount that creditors 
place on that debt (which may be inferred from the secondary market 
price if  that market is sufficiently well developed). Suppose that by 
relending part of the interest, and thus averting an immediate liquidity 
crisis, creditors can reduce the discount to some smaller amount, d’. 
Such a program will have a cost-the  expected loss on the new lend- 
ing-and  a benefit-the  increase in the value of existing claims. The 
cost will be d’L,  where L is the value of new lending; while the benefit 
will be (d - d’)D. Thus a program of defensive lending will be worth 
undertaking as long as 
d’L < (d - d’)D, 
or 
LID < (d - d’)/d’. 
Now suppose that in the absence of a program of defensive lending 
the discount on claims would be 50 percent, while even with such a 
program the discount would be reduced only to 40 percent. Even with 
these fairly dismal numbers, it would be worthwhile for creditors to 
expand their exposure by 25 percent to protect their original investment. 
The orthodox view of the debt problem was that this incentive for 
defensive  lending could be used to mobilize  new bank  lending on a 
sufficient scale that, combined with adjustment efforts by the countries 
and  an improving external environment, problem  debtors could  be 
returned to normal  capital  market access after a few  years.  It was 
recognized from the beginning, however, that there were serious ob- 
stacles to mobilization  of capital flows from existing creditors; these 
obstacles now look more serious than was realized in  1983. 
15.3  Bank Lending to Problem Debtors Since 1982 
15.3.1 
Table 15.1 presents a first overview of the lending of banks from the 
opening of the debt strategy at the end of 1982 to the end of  1986. The 
essential impression conveyed by the table is that the mobilization of 
private capital flows to debtors that was a central element of the debt 
strategy took place to a very limited extent in  1983 and 1984 and ba- 
sically not at all since. Whether one looks at the broader aggregate of 
problem debtors or the narrower aggregate of Latin America, one sees 
that since 1982, and especially since 1984, debtor countries have run 
noninterest surpluses large enough to cover the bulk of their interest 
due, with a small contribution from official sources and very little from 
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Table 15.1  Indicators of  Bank Lending to Problem Debtors 
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private  new money.  Only  in  1986 was there a move toward  current 
account deficit, which must have had capital inflows as its counterpart; 
more on this turn of events later. 
Admittedly, this aggregative picture is somewhat misleading, for two 
reasons. First, it conceals differences among countries. While banks 
were on net withdrawing from some troubled but still relatively liquid 
debtors (e.g., Venezuela), they were significantly expanding their ex- 
posure in others. Second, the flow of funds reveals disbursements, but 
it is at least equally important to look at commitments, especially given 
the role of  “concerted”  lending for defensive purposes. Tables  15.2 
and  15.3 provide some information on these issues. They show that 
while the details are more complex than aggregates convey, the essen- 
tial point remains that there has not been much bank lending to  problem 
debtors, especially  after  1983-84.  The central question is  why  the 
seemingly forceful case for defensive lending generated only a brief, 
modest injection of new money. 
15.3.2  Debtor Performance and the Supply of Funds 
The bankers themselves prefer to ascribe their limited willingness to 
lend to the failure of the countries to show adequate progress in eco- 
nomic policy. However, there are good reasons to discount this view. 
For one thing, the criticism seems unreasonable. Debtor countries have 
achieved trade surpluses greater than anyone believed possible in 1983. 
Admittedly this is the inevitable counterpart of the absence of new 
money, but it still means that in the most direct issue of performance, 290  Paul Krugman 
Table 15.2  Bank Lending to Selected Countries (billions of dollars) 
1985  1986 
1983  1984  1985  1 st half  I st half 
15 Heavily Indebted  11.1  5.4  -  1.9  -  1.2  -  3.4 
Argentina  2.3  0.3  0.6  0.7  0.1 
Brazil  5.2  5.2  ~  2.9  -  1.0  ~  1.0 
Korea  2.2  3.5  2.3  I .4  -  0.2 
Mexico  2.8  1.2  0.7  0.  I  -0.8 
Venezuela  -  1.3  -  2.2  0.4  -0.1  ~  0.3 
Countries 
Source:  M.  Watson,  R.  Kincaid, C. Atkinson,  E.  Kalter,  and  D.  Folkerts-Landau, 
International  Capitul Markets: Developments und Prospects, International Monetary 
Fund, December 1986. 
Table 15.3  LDC Lending Commitments (billions of dollars) 
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1984:l  1984:2  1985"  1986" 
All capital  47.0  42.6  32.6  29.9  16.1  17.6  12.3  13.2  18.7 
importers 
Latin America 
Total  25.2  23.0  15.3  15.4  2.5  11.4  4.0  2.4  7.9 
Spontaneous  25.2  23.0  2.0  0.6  0.1  0.3  0.1  0.1  0.2 
Concerted  13.3  14.8  2.4  11.1  3.7  2.3  7.7 
Source: See table 15.2 
"First 3 quarters 
the ability and willingness to generate foreign exchange with which to 
service debt, the countries have delivered  more, not less, than  was 
expected of them. 
More fundamentally, the asserted link between debtor performance 
and the availability of new money confuses defensive lending with free- 
market transactions. For a country that is borrowing from voluntary 
lenders on the open market, the ability to borrow does indeed depend 
on confidence in the country's management and prospects. Once prob- 
lem debtor status has been achieved, however, the new money provided 
through concerted action is not governed  by the same motives. Pro- 
vided  that they  are able to act cooperatively,  creditors will  lend  as 
much as they have to in order to protect their investment, not as much 
as the country has earned or as much as it can be expected to service. 
If  anything, good economic policies,  by  reducing the need  for new 
capital, may  weaken a  country's  bargaining  position  and lead  to a 
reduction of  the supply of new money and a worsening of its terms. 
A perverse relationship between performance and the supply of new 
money is evident in the case of Mexico. When Mexico was apparently 291  Private Capital Flows to Problem Debtors 
able to run massive trade surpluses while resuming modest growth, it 
received no new money. When oil prices collapsed, the first new-money 
package in more than two years was negotiated. 
15.3.3  The Free-Rider Problem 
One prospect that raised fears in the early stages of the debt problem 
was  that defensive lending  by  creditors would  be  paralyzed  by  the 
problem  of getting  collective action. There is  an inherent  free-rider 
problem in defensive lending: The collective lending of existing cred- 
itors raises the expected value of their collective claims, but for any 
individual creditor it would be preferable to opt out. In effect, the call 
for defensive lending from creditors asks that lenders, whom we sup- 
pose act competitively under normal circumstances, suddenly begin to 
act collusively once the country is in debt trouble. 
Data on U.S. banks does show evidence of a free-rider problem. The 
small regional banks have consistently either reduced  their LDC ex- 
posure more or expanded it less than either the money center banks 
or the middle-sized banks. However, the concentration of debt in the 
hands of larger banks is sufficient that this has been only a minor drag 
on net bank lending.  Put differently,  even if  all banks had increased 
their exposure as rapidly as the money center banks, there would still 
have been a very modest flow of bank lending to problem debtors. And 
as long as defensive lending remains  worthwhile, free riding should 
have led tofaster, not slower growth in the exposure of the core banks. 
15.3.4  Bargaining Power 
The simplest explanation for low bank lending is that the banks did 
not  lend because they did  not  have to:  They found themselves in a 
strong enough bargaining position to extract full interest from the coun- 
tries without a quid pro quo of new money.  Defensive lending failed 
to take place because it was unnecessary.  The corollary to this view 
is that the failure of the banks to come up with new money in  1984- 
86 does not show that they can never be induced to do so; the banks 
did not fail to act in  their own interest. 
The principal evidence for the view that banks were simply striking 
a hard bargain with the debtors is negative. There is no indication that 
banks were disappointed  in the performance  of debtors in  1984-85, 
leading to unwillingness to lend (and in any case we have already argued 
that there is if  anything a perverse connection between performance 
and defensive lending). There were no cases of new-money packages 
scuttled by attempts of small banks to free ride. Most important, until 
1986 there was no indication  that the failure to provide new money 
was pushing countries to the edge of refusal to pay interest. 292  Paul Krugman 
In a sense the question should be put the other way. It is not very 
puzzling that banks lent so little, since they seem to have judged cor- 
rectly that they could do so without adverse consequences. The ques- 
tion is why the countries were so willing to acquiesce. 
One point that may help explain the acquiescence of the countries 
is the cynical but unfortunately  apparently valid political observation 
that only the recent rate of change of the economic situation, not the 
level, matters for political purposes. By this criterion the debtors were, 
in  1984 and 1985, doing acceptably  well; although their incomes had 
taken a severe beating in 1981  -83,  in 1984-85 Mexico achieved modest 
growth  and  Brazil rapid  growth, despite the need  to run  very  large 
trade surpluses. Again, the impression one gets is that the countries 
felt they were doing well enough to be unwilling  to press their case 
with the bankers and set in motion unknown risks. 
Another important element in debtors’ willingness to accept an un- 
favorable bargain has probably been the political pressure from creditor 
country governments, especially the United States, carrying the im- 
plicit message that sanctions of a nonfinancial kind will be imposed on 
debtors that fail to service their debt. 
15.3.5  Implications 
The failure of the commercial banks to provide new money on the 
scale envisaged in  1983 has been seen by many observers, including 
myself,  as a sign  of the unworkability  of the strategy  of relying on 
concerted lending by existing creditors. This interpretation  would be 
correct if  the lack of new  money essentially reflected  an inability of 
the creditors to undertake collective action. The discussion here sug- 
gests, however, that this was not the case; that creditors were acting 
in a collectively rational fashion, and that they lent so little because 
that was the strategy  that made  sense in  their own interest. If  this 
alternative explanation is correct, then a change in the situation can 
lead to a very different response from the banks. If  the countries be- 
come tougher bargainers, or the banks less tough, then bank lending 
can still be provided, as the Mexican package illustrates. 
15.4  Debt Conversion Schemes as an Alternative to Bank Lending 
A number of analysts have  suggested that the answer to the debt 
problem lies to  a significant degree in encouraging other  forms of capital 
inflow to substitute for bank financing. In particular, financial industry 
experts have pressed  strongly for the conversion of foreign debt into 
equity claims. Thus our discussion  of bank  lending must be  supple- 
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Advocates of these swaps at first seemed to be claiming that such 
conversions would simultaneously reduce countries’ external obliga- 
tions and generate an inflow of direct foreign investment. Some cooling 
of enthusiasm has occurred as careful analysis has shown that a debt- 
equity conversion in fact does neither. The advantages of debt-equity 
swaps  are  in  fact  fairly  subtle,  and  there  are  potentially  serious 
disadvantages. 
Debt-equity swaps are actually part of a broader array of schemes 
in  which  investors who have acquired  some of a country’s external 
debt at a discount on the secondary market are permitted to redeem 
that debt for some kind of domestic asset. In the largest program of 
debt conversion  to date, that in  Chile,  more  than  half  of  the debt 
conversion has actually taken the form of sales of debt to the debtors, 
without any requirement that the proceeds be invested in equity. 
Investments made by means of debt conversion schemes in no case 
contribute to net capital  inflow;  the  whole  point  is that they allow 
investors to acquire claims on a country through a transaction with the 
country’s creditors rather than its residents. The potential benefits lie 
instead in the future effect on a country’s stream of net investment 
income. First, debt, which carries with it an obligation to make a flat 
stream of nominal  payments over time, may  be replaced  with other 
liabilities whose payment stream rises over time with growth and in- 
flation. This services the same aim of shifting the time profile of pay- 
ments that defensive lending was supposed to accomplish. Second, in 
some circumstances debt conversion may  serve as a backdoor route 
to debt forgiveness; investors may be induced to acquire assets with 
an expected present value less than the face value of the converted 
debt. 
Against these potential benefits must be set two possible costs. First 
is that a debt conversion scheme may divert capital inflow that would 
otherwise have taken place through other channels; since at best debt 
conversion makes no contribution to net capital inflow, any such di- 
version represents a net capital outflow. Second is the possibility that 
debt conversion schemes will have an adverse fiscal impact. 
Although many debt conversion schemes are possible, the essential 
advantages and disadvantages may be understood by making two key 
distinctions. On one side is the distinction between debt-equity swaps, 
in  which  debt must be converted into equity and held in that form, 
and “debt-peso’’  swaps, in which debt is converted into cash without 
a restriction on how that cash is to be invested. On the other side is 
the distinction between conversions involving private debt, which have 
no fiscal impact, and those involving  public  or publicly-guaranteed 
debt. 294  Paul Krueman 
15.4.1 
The most favorable kind of debt conversion is one in which the debt 
of private firms is exchanged for equity (not necessarily of the same 
firms). Since dividends can be expected to rise over time with inflation 
and economic growth, this serves the desirable aim of tilting the time 
profile of a country’s payments to foreign creditors in the direction of 
the time profile of its ability to pay. A secondary advantage is that to 
the extent that earnings on equity are related to the economic state of 
the country this  conversion shifts the country to a  more  equitable 
sharing of risk. 
Even this  most  favorable  form of  debt conversion, however,  can 
aggravate a country’s foreign exchange constraint in the short run. To 
the extent that a purchase of equity through debt conversion substitutes 
for a purchase that would have taken place in any case-that  is, to the 
extent that there is anything less than 100% additionality-the  con- 
version reduces net capital inflows. Since some substitution of debt- 
equity swaps for capital inflows is surely unavoidable, even this best 
case of debt conversion represents a trade-off of a worsened  capital 
account now for a more favorable investment income profile  in the 
future. 
Conversions of Private Debt to Equity 
15.4.2 
A sale of external debt back to the creditor, without a requirement 
that the proceeds be invested in equity, differs from a debt-equity swap 
both in being less likely to have favorable effects on the profile of future 
investment payments, and in  running greater risks of  worsening the 
capital account in the short run. 
The best case of a “debt-peso’’ swap would be one in which domestic 
residents  are induced  to repatriate external assets that they  would 
otherwise have retained outside the country. The initial capital account 
impact of this transaction would be zero. Future payments of interest 
and principal would be reduced. However, because the owners of the 
repatriated capital would  presumably  invest the funds domestically, 
they would in future substitute the income from these investments for 
additional repatriations. Thus the overall effect on the stream of re- 
source transfers that the country must make to the rest of the world 
is uncertain; it depends on the planned domestic consumption of the 
investors. 
The concern with debt conversions not tied to equity investment is 
that they offer greater opportunity than debt-equity swaps for actions 
that worsen the capital account. Most extreme would be the case where 
debt is converted into domestic currency, and this currency is  then 
converted (legally or illegally) into foreign exchange and exported again. 
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Such “round-tripping”  would turn debt conversions into a device for 
facilitating capital flight. Less dramatically but equally harmful in its 
effect on the capital account is the use of debt conversions as a sub- 
stitute channel for repatriation of earnings on overseas assets; the effect 
of this substitution is to reduce net capital inflows one-for-one. 
The main justification that one might offer for unrestricted conver- 
sions of debt is that they may serve as an indirect way for a country 
to buy back its own debt at a discount; more on this below. 
15.4.3  Conversion of Public Debt 
Conversion of public debt, whether into equity or unrestricted, has 
the same effects as conversion of private debt, with an additional fiscal 
impact. 
The conversion  of external public  debt into local currency, if  not 
sterilized, will be inflationary. Thus it must be offset  by an issue of 
domestic debt, which turns it from the point of view of the government 
into a swap of foreign for local currency debt. From a fiscal point of 
view, this  is a definite  disadvantage. The reason is  that in  problem 
debtors real interest rates on internal debt are far higher than on ex- 
ternal debt. This in turn reflects the fact that the credibility of govern- 
ment promises to repay, both internal and external, is uncertain. In the 
case of external debt, however, rescheduling agreements have frozen 
creditors into holding claims at an interest rate well below what they 
would require to hold those claims voluntarily. A debt conversion un- 
freezes these claims and converts them into new, short-term claims on 
which the government must pay a high enough interest rate to com- 
pensate for risk  of  nonpayment. Thus a debt conversion involving 
public  debt, even if  it is structured so as not  to worsen the capital 
account, trades off the benefit of an improved composition of external 
liabilities for the cost of worsened fiscal situation. 
15.4.4  Summary 
This review of  the effects of debt conversions does not convey a 
favorable impression. However, there is one other potential advantage 
of debt conversions that may be an important motivation: they offer 
an end run around some of the legal and institutional obstacles to debt 
forgiveness. Given the substantial discounts on secondary market sales 
of problem debtors’ obligations, some governments may regard it as a 
worthwhile investment to buy back their own national debt. However, 
direct buyback at a discount raises legal problems.  By inducing third 
parties to buy the debt, and then collecting some fee for the process, 
governments can achieve approximately  the same result.  Thus Chile 
has auctioned off rights to “debt-peso” conversions (though not debt- 
equity swaps), which in effect allows the government to buy back the 296  Paul Krugman 
debt at a discount equal to the auction premium. Other countries may 
achieve the same aim by specifying a different exchange rate for debt 
conversions than for other transactions. 
At least so far, however, the debt forgiveness aspect has been limited. 
In the Chilean case the auction prices on debt-peso conversions have 
been much smaller than the secondary market discounts, presumably 
reflecting the fact that within  Chile, with capital exports controlled, 
the shadow price of foreign exchange is higher than its official price. 
And debt-equity swaps are not auctioned off. 
In summary, the idea of using debt-equity conversion as an alter- 
native to defensive lending has been heavily  oversold.  Such conver- 
sions not only cannot eliminate the need for debt-creating capital inflows, 
they may easily increase rather than decrease the necessity for new 
borrowing. 
15.5  Outlook for Capital Flows 
Direct foreign  investment cannot be counted on to provide the fi- 
nancing that banks have failed to provide, and schemes like debt-equity 
swaps are much more problematic than their sponsors seem to have 
appreciated. The desirability of debt relief is still controversial, and in 
any case it poses operational difficulties that none of the actors in the 
debt situation seem at this point ready to take the lead in resolving. 
Thus the central question regarding financing for problem debtors is 
whether involuntary lending by banks can be restarted. This depends 
crucially on the interpretation of the problems with mobilizing lending 
so far.  If  the stalling  of  lending during  1984-86  really  reflected  an 
inability of the banks to act in their own interests, prospects are bleak. 
If it represented collectively rational behavior on the part of the banks, 
then the limits on bank lending tell us only that the banks chose not 
to, not that they will not. 
The argument made here is that the evidence is most consistent with 
the view that low bank lending was the outcome of a bargaining process 
in which, for a variety of reasons, creditors had very high bargaining 
power compared with debtors. A shift in that bargaining process will 
produce a different result. Specifically, the bargain will shift if  debtor 
countries come to realize that a return to normal market access is not 
imminent, that the internal political costs of continuing full debt service 
are high, that the external cost from a failure to reach agreement with 
the banks is low, and, perhaps, that the U.S. government will not take 
political revenge on deadbeats. Given a situation of this kind, creditors 
will prefer to negotiate some combination of de facto capitalization of 
interest and reduced rates rather than fail to reach any agreement. 297  Private Capital Flows to Problem Debtors 
What about the possibility of debt moratoria and sanctions against 
the debtors? If all parties were fully informed about each others’ mo- 
tives  and  opportunities, we  would  expect everyone immediately to 
reach a bargain that reflected the ability of the players to mete out and 
receive punishment, without any necessity for the actions actually to 
take place. However, given the uncertainty involved, it will probably 
be necessary for players to demonstrate their resolve by announcing 
debt moratoria, seizing assets, and so on. Ideally third parties would 
be able to mediate and avoid such open confrontations, which have 
real costs, although less than is often supposed. However, the impor- 
tant point if  confrontations cannot be avoided-which  will sometimes 
be the case-is  to realize that periods in which debtors and creditors 
fail to reach agreement are a part of the game, not the end of it. 
Thus the outlook, if  this analysis is correct, is in fact for a revival 
of bank financing to the debtors. This financing may for a while take 
the form of arrearages, until the debtors and creditors reach agreement. 
Eventually it will be formalized in a new agreement. There will be new 
bank lending because the countries will need it; the moral of this chapter 
has been that the supply of capital to problem debtors is, in the end, 
driven by the demand. 
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